One Court of Justice

On remand from the Michigan Supreme Court, on February 2, 2010, the Court of Appeals published a per curiam opinion in People v. Dowdy, No. 287689.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of charges against a homeless defendant for his failure to comply with the reporting requirements of the Sex Offenders Registration Act (“SORA”), MCL § 28.721 et seq.  Although acknowledging that the terms “domicile” and “residence” are often used interchangeably, the Court of Appeals emphasized that the term “residence” generally, and as it is defined in SORA, does not include the intent to make a residence a permanent home.  Under the plain language of SORA, the term “residence” refers to a place, dwelling, or abode, where an individual has a “regular place of lodging.”  Applying dictionary definitions to the term “lodging,” the Court of Appeals stated that it is defined as “[a] place to live,” or “accommodations in a house, esp. in rooms for rent[.]”  In considering whether the homeless defendant has a residence for purposes of SORA, the Court of Appeals explained that “[t]he provisional location where a homeless person happens to spend the night does not fall within the ambit of these definitions.”  The Court of Appeals recognized the Legislature’s intent to provide for public safety by requiring the maintaining of information regarding the location of convicted sex offenders, but focused on those who have a domicile or residence as defined by SORA.  The Court of Appeals noted that it is solely within the province of the Legislature to require compliance by a homeless person by including a provision in SORA regarding reporting requirements for the homeless.