One Court of Justice

On November 6, the Michigan Supreme Court denied one motion to waive fees, denied two applications for leave, and took substantive action in three matters, which are discussed in detail after the jump.

The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment and affirmed the substance of the trial court’s ruling in Davis v. Forest River, Inc., No. 270478.  The Court’s order may be found here.  The Court reversed its prior position on this matter taken under Chief Justice Taylor.  Our previous coverage may be found here.

The case arose from Plaintiffs’ purchase of a Forest River recreational vehicle (“RV”).  Davis experienced numerous problems with the RV.  After Davis returned the RV for repairs several times, he concluded that Forest River should take the RV back and repay his purchase price.  In his complaint, Davis alleged breaches of express and implied warranties, revocation of acceptance under MCL § 440.2608, violation of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act, breach of contract, and rescission of contract.  The trial court granted revocation.  The Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that plaintiff was entitled to common-law rescission, although he had not styled his claim as such.

The Supreme Court resolved the matter by considering the appropriate measure of damages under Michigan’s Uniform Commercial Code for breach of warranty, declining to reach the other issues.  The Court noted that MCL § 440.2714(2) provides the usual measure of damages for breach of warranty, stating that the measure of damages is “the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.”  The Court held that these facts presented “special circumstances” that qualified for an alternative measure of damages.  The repeated problems had destroyed plaintiff’s confidence in the RV.  As such, mere difference-in-value damages will not place the plaintiff in as good a position as though the contract had been performed.  The Court held that, in order to place the plaintiff in this position, he should be allowed to relinquish title to the RV and given damages including “the purchase price of the vehicle less the sum paid to plaintiff pursuant to case evaluation, repayment of the interest paid on the loan, and statutory interest pursuant to MCL 600.6013(8).”

In lieu of granting appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in People v. Weddell, No. 137374.  Weddell was charged with fleeing and eluding a police officer resulting in a collision, and malicious or willful destruction of police property.  A police officer noticed that she was driving with a large duffel bag attached to her hood ornament, and attempted to pull her over.  Weddell refused to pull over, and, during the ensuing chase, drove into police officers’ cars several times.  Weddell pled not guilty by reason of insanity.  At trial, Weddell presented testimony from a psychologist that she was mentally ill and so not criminally responsible for her actions.  The prosecutor cross-examined the psychologist and played a video recording of the chase and arrest taken by the pursuing police officers, as well as calling several other witnesses and presenting various exhibits.  The jury found Weddell guilty but mentally ill.  Weddell moved for a new trial arguing that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.  The trial court denied the motion.  The Court of Appeals reversed.  The Supreme Court held that the prosecutor’s evidence and cross examination of the psychologist provided sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, reversing the Court of Appeals and reinstating the trial court’s judgment.  Justice Corrigan concurred, providing a more detailed examination of the matter than the majority’s one-paragraph order.  The Court’s order may be found here.

The Court granted oral argument on whether to grant leave in Dadd v. Mount Hope Church, No. 139223.  The Court’s order may be found here.  The case arose from a prayer meeting at Mount Hope Church (the “Church”).  Dadd was before the Church’s altar during an “altar call.”  An altar call is where the congregants come to the altar to be “prayed over.”  Often, the prayers overcome the congregants and they fall to the ground.  The Church generally provided ushers to catch the congregants should they be so overcome.  During her altar call, Dadd fell, but the ushers did not catch her and she sustained injuries.  Dadd then sued the Church.  In response, the Church sent a letter to other prayer-group members informing them of the suit and disparaging Dadd.  The Church also allegedly disparaged Dadd in other meetings.  Dadd then amended her complaint to include intentional infliction of emotional distress, false light, slander, and libel.  To defend the slander and libel claims, the Church sought an instruction on qualified privilege based on the common interests shared by the members of the Church.  The trial court refused to give the instruction.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.  The Church appealed.  The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in refusing the instruction.  Dadd appealed.  As noted above, the Supreme Court has granted oral argument on whether it should grant leave.  The Court directed that the parties address three issues in a supplemental briefing: “(1) whether, in light of Van Vliet v Vander Naald, 290 Mich 365 (1939), Westerhouse v De Witt, 215 Mich 295 (1921), and Howard v Dickie, 120 Mich 238 (1899), the reciprocal duty or interest giving rise to the qualified privilege at issue in this case applies to all church members generally, or only to members who are decision makers engaged in the conduct of church business; (2) when and under what conditions does the qualified privilege cease to apply with regard to persons who are no longer church members; and (3) if an instruction on qualified privilege was required, whether the failure to give this instruction was harmless error in light of the jury’s findings on the jury verdict form.”