One Court of Justice

On a busy Friday before the holiday weekend, in addition to other granted applications discussed further in separate posts, the Michigan Supreme Court granted an application and asked for further briefing in a township taxation issue. 

In Cherryland Electric Cooperative v East Bay Township and Garfield Township, the parties were asked to brief: (1) whether a township assessor has an independent obligation to determine the true cash value of all property within the jurisdiction of a township, or whether, in determining true cash value, a township assessor is obligated to follow the personal tax reporting form approved by the State Tax Commission; and (2) whether these cases involve a mutual mistake of fact within the meaning of MCL 211.53a.

In addition, our high court held one criminal appeal in abeyance pending determination of a similar case.

In what promises to be an important decision for post-conviction relief petitions, our Supreme Court has granted an application to address the applicable standard for an innocence claim under MCR 6.508(D).  This particular armed robbery case — with an apparently long procedural history – originates from a 1995 Wayne County Circuit Court criminal file, People v William Craig Garrett.  Two currently sitting justices, Markman and Cavanagh, have previously voted to grant leave for this case on a prior trip up to our high court.  It appears that ineffective assistance of counsel at trial will also be an issue in this appeal.

Besides the threshold legal standard, the parties are asked to address: (1) whether this case meets the applicable standard; (2) whether any other rule under the 6.500 series offers relief for a “significant possibility” of actual innocence; and (3) whether, if MCR 6.508(D) does bar relief, if there’s any recourse for a person with “a significant possibility of actual innocence” under the Michigan or U.S. Constitutions.

Justice McCormack, who recently joined the bench after a long career bringing 6.500 petitions and similar actual innocence cases, concurred to suggest additional analysis of these issues: (1) whether MCR 6.508(D)(2) bars relief premised on issues previously decided on direct appeal; (2) whether that subsection bars relief for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel premised on an issue decided against the defendant on direct appeal; (3) the scope of relief available under MCR 7.316(A)(7) (which allows the MSC to “enter any judgment or order that ought to have been entered, and enter other and further orders and grant relief as the case may require”) in light of MCR 6.508(D); and (4) when MCR 6.508(D) bars relief, if a court may then consider evidence and arguments presented at an earlier stage of review.  Justice Markman joined Justice McCormack’s concurrence.  In addition, the bench invited amici briefs from Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan and the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.

The Supreme Court denied Mr. Garrett’s original application for leave to appeal in 1997.  456 Mich. 876 (Sept. 29, 1997).  The trial court later held an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Garrett’s motion for a new trial based on newly discovered alibi evidence (as well as new polygraph and other evidence), and granted a new trial in April 1999.  The Court of Appeals peremptorily reversed that order, but only addressed the alibi evidence issue, on July 28, 1999 (Docket No. 219803).  On leave granted, the Court of Appeals later took up the issue of the complainant’s mental condition, and its effect on her testimony, and whether the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, but again denied relief.  No. 222304, 2001 WL 1388398 (Nov. 6, 2001).  In 2003, the Supreme Court denied Mr. Garrett’s application for leave again, although Justices Markman, Cavanagh and Kelly would have granted leave.  467 Mich. 936 (Jan. 3, 2003).

The Supreme Court granted the application of an interest group challenging the Court of Appeals’ affirmance permitting Detroit Edison to issue a prospective rebate to its customers to refund a prior unapproved rate increase.  Our July 2012 post on the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the prospective rebate, and the dissent arguing that it was not permitted because it was contrary to the plain language of the statute at issue, can be found here.

Detroit Edison had implemented a rate hike to customers prior to receipt of Michigan Public Service Commission approval.  When only part of the rate increase was approved, Detroit Edison wanted to refund the overcharge by crediting a future bill.  The Association of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equity (ABATE) argued that such a refund was impermissible under the applicable statute and failed to compensate past customers who paid the unapproved additional charges.

In Zaher v. Miotke, the Court of Appeals held that an easement granted by a husband across property owned in his name alone was not invalid on the ground that his wife did not join in the conveyance.  While a wife’s dower interest entitles her to a one-third life estate in her husband’s real property after his death, that interest merely creates a cloud on the property’s title and it does not nullify an easement granted by the husband alone. Read more »

The Michigan Supreme Court granted the applications for leave to appeal in both SMK, LLC v. Dep’t of Treasury and Fradco, Inc v. Dep’t of Treasury, and ordered that the two cases be argued and submitted to the Court together.  The parties shall address:  (1) whether the running of the 35-day time period in MCL 205.22(1) for an aggrieved taxpayer to file an appeal in the Tax Tribunal from a final assessment is triggered when the Department of Treasury complies with the notice provision of MCL 205.28(1)(a), or is there an additional notice requirement under MCL 205.8 when a taxpayer has filed a proper written request designating an official representative to receive copies of letters and notices; and (2) whether the tolling ruling adopted by the Tax Tribunal and the Court of Appeals is contrary to the finality language of MCL 205.22(4) and (5).

The Court also granted leave to appeal in People v. Harris, limited to the issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction of extortion.

In Knight v. Northpoint Bank, the Court of Appeals upheld the application of the equitable doctrine of laches to defeat a challenge to a Bank’s claim to real property finding that the plaintiff, who also claimed title to the subject property, lived adjacent to that property for over eight years, but did not assert her rights during that time.  The Court also rejected plaintiff’s argument that the Bank’s chain of title was facially defective because it flowed from an agent transferring title to herself through a power of attorney.  The Court found that such a transfer is appropriate where it is consistent with the agent’s duties to the principal.  Here, the agent and principal both died during plaintiff’s period of delay, thus prejudicing the Bank’s rights to prove the validity of the transfer.  Under these circumstances, the Court of Appeals found that the application of laches was proper.

In People v. Wambar the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for assisting in the unlawful taking of a child, despite the fact that the defendant was the child’s biological father, because the defendant’s parental rights had been terminated.  Michigan Statute MCL 750.350 prohibits the taking of a child from his parent or guardian, but exempts the natural or adoptive parent of the child from conviction under the statute.  The court held that for the purpose of the statute, the term “natural parent” does not include a biological parent whose parental rights have been terminated.

In Price v. High Pointe Oil Company, Inc., the Michigan Supreme Court adhered to the long-standing common law rule that noneconomic damages are not recoverable for negligent destruction of property.  While the general rule in tort cases is that a plaintiff may recover for all injuries resulting directly from a wrongful act, including both economic and noneconomic injuries, a different rule applies in cases involving damage to property, for which a plaintiff may recover only the cost of replacement or repair. Read more »

In In re C. I. Morris, the Court of Appeals held that where there is no record evidence that a child is eligible for membership in any Indian tribe, and where the caseworker and trial court have assured that all available genealogical information has been provided to potential tribes, the burden shifts to the respondent to show that the child is an “Indian child” for purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”).  Because the proper notices were sent to potential tribes in this matter, and because the respondent-father failed to provide any evidence that ICWA applied, the order terminating parental rights was affirmed. Read more »

The Court of Appeals held that governmental immunity could protect a police officer from her failure to report child abuse or neglect under the Child Protection Law, in Jones v. Bitner (In re Estate of Jones).  The Government Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) provides protections for government employees acting in their official capacities, including that where they are accused of a negligent tort, they must be grossly negligent and the proximate cause of the loss.  The plaintiffs argued that the Child Protection Law abrogated this immunity by providing that a mandatory reporter who fails to report “is civilly liable for the damages proximately caused.”  The Court disagreed, holding that the GTLA governed as the more recent and more specific statute.  The Court then remanded the case to allow the trial court to determine whether the plaintiff’s requested amended complaint could meet the GTLA’s standard.