One Court of Justice

In Uniloy Milacron USA, Inc v Department of Treasury, No 300749, the Court of Appeals considered whether the Single Business Tax Act apportioned certain sales to Michigan.  Plaintiff Uniloy Milacron USA, Inc. (“Uniloy”) manufactures molds.  Uniloy entered into a distributor agreement with Uniloy Milacron, Inc. (“UMI”), an affiliated corporation.  Under the agreement, UMI would solicit and obtain orders for Uniloy’s products.  Uniloy would then ship the products directly to the end-user.  On its Michigan tax return, Uniloy only apportioned to Michigan sales shipped to end-users residing in Michigan.  Following an audit, the Department of Treasury decided this was improper and assessed a deficiency.  Uniloy paid under protest and filed this action in the Court of Claims.  The Court of Claims held in Uniloy’s favor.  Treasury appealed.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.

MCL 208.52 provides, in pertinent part: “Sales of tangible personal property are in this state in any of the following circumstances: . . .  (b) For tax years beginning on and after January 1, 1998, the property is shipped or delivered to any purchaser within this state regardless of the free on board point or other conditions of the sales.”  The Court of Appeals held that MCL 208.52 unambiguously only included goods shipped to a purchaser in Michigan.  Here, the disputed goods were not shipped to a purchaser in Michigan; they were shipped out of state.  Accordingly, MCL 208.52 did not apply, and Treasury was incorrect in assessing a deficiency.

The Michigan Supreme Court granted the application for leave to appeal in State of Michigan v. McQueen.  The parties shall include among the issues to be briefed whether the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA), MCL 333.26421 et seq., allows patient-to-patient sales of marihuana.  The Court invited the Attorney General and the Michigan Association of Compassion Centers to file briefs amicus curiae.

In lieu of granting leave to appeal in People v. Sanders, pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), the Michigan Supreme Court vacated the part of the Court of Appeals judgment finding evidence of a traffic violation for failing to signal a lane change, and remanded the case to the Monroe Circuit Court for further findings of fact relating to whether the failure to signal a lane change independently justified the traffic stop.  The Court denied leave to appeal in all other respects.

In lieu of granting leave to appeal in Carlson v. City of Warren, the Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration, as on leave granted of:  whether any of the class members’ claims are barred by the three-year statute of limitations; whether the defendant has a due process right to defend against the plaintiffs’ individual claims of causation and damages in this class action and/or whether there are due process implications to the process of statistical “extrapolation” to be drawn from the testimony of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.  The Court denied leave to appeal in all other respects.  Justice Cavanagh did not participate.

In lieu of granting leave to appeal in River Investments L.C.P., LLC v. Watson Bros. Co., the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the St. Clair Circuit Court for further proceedings.  The Michigan Supreme Court determined that the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the plaintiff’s action for breach of implied warranty in this case was subject to the Statute of Repose.

In lieu of granting leave in Scion, Inc. v. Martinez, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Macomb Circuit Court’s opinion and order.  In lieu of granting leave in People v. Cooley, the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.

The Court denied five applications for leave to appeal and one application for leave to appeal as cross-appellant.

Titan Insurance Co v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance illustrates why it is important to diligently cancel a car or motorcycle registration after selling the vehicle.  The Michigan Court of Appeals was confronted with the question of which insurance company should pay personal injury protection benefits arising out of an accident between a motorcycle and an automobile when neither operator was covered by an applicable no-fault insurance policy.  Michigan’s Insurance Code sets the order of priority from which an injured person may claim benefits from the various insurers involved.  Under this statute, one of the insurers that an injured person may seek benefits from is the insurer of the “owner or registrant of the motorcycle involved in the accident.”  In this case, the motorcycle had been sold a few days before the accident, but the previous owner remained the registrant of the motorcycle because he failed to cancel his registration and allowed his license plate to remain on the motorcycle.  Accordingly, the previous owner’s insurance company was required to pay the benefits to the injured person. 

The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in Houston v. Governor.  The Court remanded People v. Scafone to the Court of Appeals.  The Court held People v. Christian and People v. Hinton in abeyance. 

The Michigan Supreme Court denied 90 applications for leave to appeal and 8 motions for reconsideration.  The Court directed the Washtenaw County Prosecuting Attorney to answer the application for leave to appeal in In re TD.

In In re Application of Mich Consolidated Gas Co to Increase Rates, the Michigan Supreme Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, and application for leave to appeal as cross-appellant by the Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, on stipulation.  The Court denied the application for leave to appeal as cross-appellant by the Attorney General.

Defendant, who allegedly burned a house that was vacant, was charged with the crime of “burning other real property” under MCL 750.73.  The trial court granted defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, and entered an order of acquittal, based on the prosecution’s failure to prove that the burned house was not a dwelling.  However, it is undisputed that the trial court erroneously added this element to the crime.

In a 4-3 decision, affirming the Court of Appeals in People v. Evans, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the trial court’s action did not constitute an acquittal for purposes of protection from retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the state and federal constitutions.  Although the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to decide this exact issue, the majority drew a distinction from other U.S. Supreme Court decisions based on the definition of acquittal set forth in United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co, 430 U.S. 564 (1977).  Specifically, in Martin Linen, the U.S. Supreme Court defined an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes as a “ruling of the judge, whatever its label, [that] actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.”  The majority purports that a “constitutionally meaningful difference exists” between cases where trial courts made “evidentiary errors regarding how to prove the governing law” and the case here where the trial court identified an extraneous element.  The majority contends that the trial court’s legal error did not resolve any “factual elements” of the offense charged, and thus does not fall within the definition of acquittal set forth in Martin Linen.

Justice Cavanagh, joined by Justice Marilyn Kelly, issued a dissenting opinion criticizing the majority’s decision for effectively overruling the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Nix, 453 Mich 619 (1996), which explained that it was irrelevant for double jeopardy purposes that an acquittal was founded on an erroneous interpretation of a governing legal principle.  Justice Cavanagh states that the distinction created by the majority “elevates form over substance” and “minimizes the United States Supreme Court’s general directive that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not provide an exception for legal errors[.]”

Justice Hathaway issued a separate dissenting opinion disagreeing with the distinction the majority draws and stating that Nix controls this case.

The Supreme Court granted three applications for leave of significance on March 23, 2012.  The first raises the issue of whether courts may examine a public body’s stated budgetary motive in defending a whistleblower claim, or if separation of powers principle prevents looking into that motive as an alleged pretext.  See Debano-Griffin v. Lake County and Lake County Bd. of Commissioners.  The underlying Court of Appeals opinion may be found here.

The next grant of leave was in Admire v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., being closely watched on issues of coverage for transportation costs and other issues involving no-fault benefits.  The Court invited amici who have participated thus far to continue through merits briefing.  Those groups include the Michigan Insurance Coalition, the Auto Club Insurance Association, and the Coalition Protecting Auto No-Fault.

The Court also agreed to hear a dispute between Lyon Charter Township (Oakland County) and McDonald’s in a very brief order found here.   The underlying Court of Appeals opinion was published at 292 Mich App 660, and reversed a condemnation award for McDonald’s based on an intangible property interest in a condo unit in a commercial development.  In the case, McDonald’s did receive compensation for a sewer easement taken by the Township but also sought “loss of market advantage” damages.  Judges O’Connell, Saad, and Beckering decided that case, with Judge Beckering concurring in the majority opinion.  Our original post on this can be found here.

The Court also issued five other miscellaneous orders, including one dismissal by stipulation and an extension of time in a  Judicial Tenure Commission case.

 In Estate of Stephen Bradley v. Kent County Sheriff’s Department, No. 299640, the Michigan Court of Appeals considered whether the Government Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) bars contempt actions against governments, where the plaintiff is seeking tort-like damages.  The Court held that the GTLA applies only to tort claims.  Where the plaintiff could allege another type of claim, like civil contempt, regardless of the nature of the damages sought, the GTLA does not apply. Read more »

On remand from the Michigan Supreme Court, in Miller-Davis Co v Ahrens Construction, Inc., No. 284037, the Court of Appeals was asked to consider whether the plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim was barred by the six-year statute of limitations in MCL 600.5807.  The Court held that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiff’s claim.  Plaintiff Miller-Davis Co. (“Miller”) had hired Defendant Ahrens Construction, Inc. (“Ahrens”) to perform certain roofing work.  Ahrens finished its work in February, 2009.  Miller did not file its complaint until May 12, 2005, more than six years after Ahrens completed its work.  The Court rejected Miller’s arguments that the limitations period should run from the date Ahrens certified the work was completed or the date that certificate of occupancy was issued, emphasizing that a breach-of-contract claim accrues when the alleged breach occurs, here the noncompliant roofing work.   Thus, Millers’ claim was barred by the statute of limitations.  Read more »

In Szyszlo v Akowitz, No. 299570, the Court of Appeals concluded that at the time plaintiff filed his medical-malpractice suit, he was a real party in interest, even though he filed bankruptcy between the accrual of his claim and the filing of his lawsuit.  The plaintiff avoided losing his interest during bankruptcy by claiming a valid exemption for the first $18,450 recouped from the lawsuit under Section 522(d)(11)(D) of the Bankruptcy Code, “which provides for an exemption for a ‘payment . . . on account of personal bodily injury.’”  The Court also determined that the plaintiff was not judicially estopped from seeking more than $15,000 in the lawsuit, even though the plaintiff listed the market value of the potential lawsuit as $15,000 at the time he filed for bankruptcy.  In short, the plaintiff’s bankruptcy did not end or limit the defendants’ malpractice liability. Read more »

The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in Morgan v. General Motors and reinstated the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission, reasoning that the Commission was correct when it held that the plaintiff could not recover benefits based on an injury date that he did not allege in his application.  The Court also reversed the judgment in People v. Nelson, directing the Calhoun Circuit Court to resentence Nelson under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.

The Supreme Court sent two other cases back to the Court of Appeals for further review.  In Alexander v Cassidy, the Court of Appeals is to address the defendants’ immunity claims, and in People v Hill, the Court of Appeals is to consider the case as on leave granted.

The Court also denied reconsideration in three cases:  LaMeau v. City of Royal Oak, Estate of Jilek v Stockson, and In re Hon. James M. Justin, 12th District Court.

In LaMeau, Justices Cavanagh and Hathaway would grant reconsideration and deny leave to appeal, while Justic Kelly would grant reconsideration for the reasons stated in her dissent.

In Estate of Jilek, Justice Markman concurred in the denial because he thought the Court correctly decided that the appropriate standard of care in this medical-malpractice case was that of family practice (because that was the only specialty of the defendant doctor) and because the evidentiary decision of the trial court to exclude evidence of the urgent-care center’s internal policies both correctly applied the law and was not “inconsistent with substantial justice.”  Justice Cavanagh dissented and would grant reconsideration for the reasons stated in his dissent in the original opinion.  Justice Kelly (who joined Justice Cavanagh’s prior dissent) and Justice Hathaway would also grant reconsideration.

In In re Hon. James M. Justin, the Court denied reconsideration and ordered Justin to pay the bill of costs.

In two cases, the Supreme Court granted motions for full-Court review of motions for disqualification, but denied the underlying motions to disqualify.  In Parise v Detroit Entertainment, LLC, the Court concluded there was no ground to disqualify either Chief Justice Young or Justice Kelly.  Chief Justice Young wrote separately to deny the motion to disqualify him, explaining that there was no claim of actual bias against him and that the allegations were insufficient to create an appearance of impropriety.  The chief justice also explained that he did not participate in the full Court’s order on the disqualification of another justice, for the reasons he has previously explained.  In Lawrence v Board of Law Examiners, the full Court held that there was no ground to disqualify Justice Markman;  Chief Justice Young again did not participate in the decision, and neither did Justice Zahra.

The Court granted leave to appeal in Price v High Pointe Oil Co, asking the parties to brief whether mental distress damages may be awarded for negligent damage to real property.  Justice Cavanagh recused himself.

Finally, the Court denied two applications for leave to appeal.