One Court of Justice

In People v. Womack, the Michigan Supreme Court ordered the defendant’s former appellate counsel to file a supplemental brief explaining why he failed to file a delayed application for leave to appeal within the deadlines set by MCR 7.205(F).  The defendant’s application for leave to appeal remains pending.

The Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, peremptorily reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision in People v. Fette, No. 140023, because the trial court’s order to remit prisoner funds for fines, costs, and assessments was correct.

The Court held two cases in abeyance pending decisions in other cases before the Court:  Paquette v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., No. 139582, pending decision in University of Michigan Board of Regents v. Titan Insurance Co., No. 136905; and Woodward Parking Co. v. City of Detroit, Nos. 140073, 140074, 140075, pending decision in Briggs Tax Service, LLC v. Detroit Public Schools, Nos. 138168, 138179, 138182.  Our previous posts on Titan and Briggs can be found here and here.

The Court also denied leave to appeal in 115 cases and reconsideration in 10 cases.

Yesterday, the Michigan Supreme Court denied one motion for reconsideration and amended an order to correct a clerical error.

The United States Supreme Court has created a separate web page with links to the substantive pleadings in the Asian Carp litigation.  That litigation encompasses three original jurisdiction actions that the State of Michigan is seeking to reopen for the purpose of obtaining an order that closes the locks and sluices connecting Illinois waterways to Lake Michigan.  The Supreme Court’s web page can be reached here.

Disclaimer:  WNJ represents amicus curiae the Michigan Shoreline Caucus in support of Michigan’s petition to reopen.

Yesterday, the Michigan Supreme Court issued one order, denying a prisoner’s motion to waive fees.

In what is believed to be the first deal of its kind anywhere in the country, Thomas M. Cooley Law School has entered into an 11-year naming-rights contract for the Lansing minor league baseball stadium that is home to the Lansing Lugnuts.  What was Oldsmobile Park is now Cooley Law School Stadium.  The National Law Journal article regarding Cooley’s new venture can be found here.

On February 23, 2010, the Court of Appeals issued its unpublished opinion in Webber v. Muy Grande Ranch, Inc., No. 289113, affirming the trial court’ s grant of summary disposition on multiple counts of fraud and breach of contract in connection with a real estate transaction.  Most relevant to practitioners, the Court’s opinion discusses a non-movant’s burden of proof when arguing that additional discovery is necessary before the trial court may make a summary disposition decision.

The Court began by emphasizing that a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may be raised at any time.  MCR 2.116(D)(4).  If a party opposes the motion on the ground that discovery is incomplete, the party must assert that a factual dispute does indeed exist, and must support that allegation “by some independent evidence.”  Bellows v. Delaware McDonald’s Corp., 206 Mich. App. 555, 561; 522 N.W.2d 707 (1994).  Here, the plaintiffs, the non-moving parties, raised the issue of incomplete discovery but failed to support their claim with independent evidence.  Instead, the plaintiffs simply cited the defendants’ brief and attached their own attorney’s deposition and the real estate purchase agreement.  None of this evidence was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, or to warrant the suspension of summary disposition proceedings until discovery was complete.

Disclaimer:  WNJ represented GreenStone Farm Credit Services, a prevailing defendant-appellee in this case.

One Michigan statute authorizes the recipient of a dishonored check to seek treble damages.  MCL § 600.2952(4)(b).  A second Michigan statute specifically addresses the business of payday loans (called “deferred presentment service transactions” by the statute) and limits recovery by payday lenders to the amount of the check plus a $25 returned-check charge.  MCL § 487.2158.  Interpreting these statutes, the commissioner of the Office of Financial and Insurance Regulation (OFIR), which licenses payday lenders, issued an administrative order prohibiting payday lenders from seeking treble damages under the first statute and stating that they could be fined or lose their licenses if they did.  A Michigan trial court struck the order down as an unconstitutional infringement on the right of access to the courts because the payday lenders were purportedly being denied their right to seek certain legal remedies in court.  In Michigan Deferred Presentment Services Association, Inc. v. Ross, No. 292685 (published Feb. 18, 2010), the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that because the two statutes conflicted, the more specific of the two would apply, and that the latter statute was more specific because it addressed remedies available to payday lenders, as opposed to members of the general public, when they received nonsufficient funds checks.  The administrative order therefore properly stated the law, the Court of Appeals concluded, and should not have been struck down.

On Wednesday February 17, 2010, the Michigan Supreme Court denied one motion by a prisoner seeking a waiver of filing fees and administratively closed the case of Howard v. Department of Corrections, Case No. 139966, for failure of the plaintiff-appellant to pay the partial filing fee. 

Additionally, in lieu of granting leave to appeal the Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case of Griesbach v. Ross, Case No. 136731, to the Oakland County Circuit Court for reconsideration in light of the Court’s decisions in Bush v. Shabahang, 484 Mich. 156 (2009) and Potter v. McLeary, 484 Mich. 397 (2009).  Our post on Bush can be found here and our summary of Potter is here.  Justice Young dissented arguing that the plaintiff does not meet the requirements of MCL § 600.2912b(3), and therefore is not entitled to the additional notice period provided by that statute, and that both Bush and Potter are inapplicable to this case.  The Court’s Order can be found here.

The Michigan Supreme Court denied an emergency application to exercise superintending control in a bar examination dispute.

Defendants who entered the plaintiff’s apartment to execute a temporary restraining order (TRO), but wrongly told the plaintiff the TRO was a federal subpoena that allowed them to enter the apartment to either take his computers or copy what was on them, may be liable for invasion of privacy and trespass.  In Dalley v. Dykema Gossett, P.L.L.C., No. 289046, a published opinion issued on February 11, 2010, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed in part a circuit court order granting summary disposition to the defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(8).  In a separate federal action, the defendants had obtained a TRO to secure certain computer data, including data from a non-party to that lawsuit, the plaintiff in this action.  Several of the defendants served the TRO by slipping it under the plaintiff’s apartment door, and soon thereafter called the plaintiff to explain that the TRO was a federal subpoena that allowed the defendants to enter the plaintiff’s apartment to either take the plaintiff’s computers and hard drives or copy the data on them.  According to the amended complaint, the plaintiff reasonably believed that he had no choice and would go to jail if he refused access to his computers.  He thereafter allowed the defendants to enter his apartment, and then directed them to the only computer that might contain information described in the TRO.  But the defendants nonetheless copied the data from two of the plaintiff’s computers and four hard drives.  The Court of Appeals held that because the plaintiff alleged defendants gained access to the plaintiff’s apartment through subterfuge and threat, and then copied more than the one computer to which the plaintiff had consented, the plaintiff stated a claim for invasion of privacy.  For the same reasons, the Court held that the defendants’ misrepresentations could reasonably be found to have vitiated the plaintiff’s consent to enter his apartment, and the plaintiff also stated a claim for trespass.  The Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process, and tortious interference with a business relationship.