One Court of Justice

On March 30, 2009 the Michigan Supreme Court denied one motion to waive fees.

On March 28, 2009, the Michigan Supreme Court denied six applications for leave; held People v. Richards, Case No. 137577 in abeyance pending the Court’s resolution of People v. Idziak, Case No. 137301; and granted rehearing in United States Fidelity Insurance & Guaranty Co. v. Michigan Catastrophic Claims Assoc., Case Nos. 133466, 133468.  Justices Corrigan and Young would have denied rehearing in the Fidelity Insurance case, in which the Court had held, 4-3, that where an MCCA member’s policy only provides coverage for “reasonable charges,” the MCCA has the authority to refuse to indemnify unreasonable charges.  (The Fidelity Insurance December 29, 2008 opinion, concurrence, and dissents can be found here.)

There are two notes of interest regarding the Fidelity Insurance case.  First, Justice Markman, who concurred but did not join the original majority opinion, did not join the dissent from the order granting rehearing.  Second, the Court declined to order additional briefing or a second oral argument, meaning that Justice Hathaway will be asked to decide the case based solely on the original briefing and argument, held while then-Chief Justice Taylor was still a member of the Court.

On March 25, 2009, the Michigan Supreme Court denied three applications for leave to appeal, held one case in abeyance until a decision is rendered in Bush v. Shabahang, and denied one motion for a waiver of fees in a civil action against the Ingham County Circuit Judge.  The court also took substantive action in one criminal case, People v. Gonzales.  This case is discussed after the jump. Read more »

Yesterday, in Laketon Township v. Advanse, Inc., Case No. 276986, the Michigan Court of Appeals reaffirmed that the time for determining whether a nonconforming use vests in a property owner is the date the relevant zoning ordinance was enacted or amended.  Defendant purchased a property known as Sunset Beach Cottages in Laketon Township and began short-term rentals of a house that the previous owners had used as their permanent residence.  At the time of purchase, the Township zoning ordinance did not prohibit the new use.  In response to complaints about short-term rentals at other properties, the Township amended its ordinance to bar that use.  The trial court enjoined Defendant, ruling that Defendant could not expand the use made by the prior owner.  The Court reversed, stating that “Michigan case law and MCL 125.3208 both emphasize that the enactment date of the ordinance ‘is the critical point in determining when a nonconforming use vests.’”  Disclaimer:  WNJ represented the prevailing appellant in this matter.

On Friday, the Michigan Court of Appeals issued a published per curiam opinion in which it clarified Michigan law on “first priority insurer” status in a dispute between two insurance companies related to “personal injury protection” (PIP) under Michigan’s no-fault insurance law.  Tevis v. Amex Assurance Co. (Case No. 282412).  Plaintiff incurred serious injuries as he was driving his motorcycle.  The automobile involved in the accident was insured by Amex through a policy issued in the state of Washington.  Amex, though it had registered in Michigan under MCL § 500.3163, did not provide no-fault coverage to the automobile driver.  However, the automobile driver’s parents did have a no-fault policy issued through Geico Indemnity Co.  When both insurers declined to play plaintiff PIP benefits, plaintiff filed suit.  

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On Friday, the Michigan Court of Appeals issued a published opinion in the consolidated case of Shaw v. City Ecorse (Case Nos. 279997 and 280693).  One case involved the termination of the city’s police chief and the other involved the termination of a fire captain. 

The fire captain (Case No. 279997) claimed that he was improperly terminated under Michigan’s Whistleblower act, MCL § 15.362, for expressing opinions about the status of the city’s fire department.  The circuit court granted the city’s motion for summary disposition, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that at least some of the fire captain’s comments were protected by the act.

The police chief (Case No. 280693) claimed that he was the victim of age discrimination and a breach of contract when he was forced to retire by the city council.  The case went to a jury, which awarded the police chief $1.75 million in damages.  The city appealed the verdict, claiming that it should be subject to remittitur due to claimed insufficiency of evidence to support the amount of the non-economic damages award and the amount of the pension benefits award.  The court of appeals affirmed the decision in all respects.

On March 23, 2009, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal in 113 cases, denied reconsideration in 20 cases, and held 6 cases in abeyance.  The Court also vacated the sentence imposed by the circuit court in People v. Duley, No. 137194, available here, and it remanded the case for resentencing.

On March 20, 2009, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal in four cases.

Today, the Michigan Court of Appeals released a published per curiam opinion that affirmed a trial court’s dismissal of claims brought by Kenyatta Hudson against various defendants, including Marshall Mathers (aka, Eminem).  Hudson v. Mathers, Case No. 280396.  The court affirmed that Hudson could not enforce a management contract against one defendant (not Mathers) because Hudson was not a licensed personnel agent as required under MCL § 339.1019(b).  (Moreover, the court noted that Hudson could not succeed on an equitable theory against that defendant in light of the Michigan Supreme Court’s interesting decision in Stokes v. Millen Roofing Co., 466 Mich 660, 649 NW2d 371 (2002).)

Hudson’s unjust enrichment claim against the other defendants (including Mathers) fared no better, as the court noted that a claim for unjust enrichment could not exist where, as here, an express contract covered the same subject matter.

On March 18, 2009, the Michigan Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision in People v. Swafford, No 136751, holding that a prosecutor’s lodging of a detainer with U.S. Marshals—rather than the prison where the defendant was incarcerated—was sufficient to trigger the speedy trial  process prescribed by the Interstate Agreement on Retainers (IAD), MCL § 780.601.

In the ordinary case, the prosecutor will lodge a detainer at the place of incarceration.  If the defendant then makes a request for final disposition of the indictment, the prosecutor must bring the case to trial within 180 days or the charges will be dismissed with prejudice.  The Court noted that the IAD does not indicate that it is only applicable when the detainer is lodged at the place of incarceration, and it was undisputed that the defendant’s place of incarceration received the detainer.  Because the prosecutor subsequently failed to begin trial within 180 days of the defendant’s request for disposition, the statute mandated dismissal of all charges with prejudice.  As the Court observed:  “However harsh and inflexible a remedy for failure to comply with the IAD this may be adjudged, it is plainly what our Legislature requires.”  The opinion can be found here.