The Crime Victim’s Rights Act, MCL 780.766(5), provides that a person who is the victim of a crime that results in a “serious impairment of body function” may be awarded up to three times the restitution amount, at the trial court’s discretion.  In this case, the defendant struck the victim in the eye with a high-heeled shoe, causing the victim to lose her eye.  She was found guilty of misdemeanor assault, and the trial court tripled the restitution award under the statute.  The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the defendant’s argument that the court should not have tripled the restitution award for the loss of an eye.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that the loss of an eye constitutes a “serious impairment of a body function,” and the plain language does not limit or specify what the trial court may consider in exercising its discretion.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to triple the actual restitution award.

The ordinance, No. 2010-514, placed a $12 million limit on the balance of a reserve for the Inflation Equity Fund (“IEF”) and a $5 million limit on the distribution of monies from the IEF to eligible retirees and survivor beneficiaries, commonly referred to as the “13th check” distribution.  Neither of these were ever subject to a dollar cap before.  IEF is meant to protect retirees from the effects of inflation.  Although 13th check is discretionary, retirees have received it without fail since the mid-1980s.  The ordinance also redirected the balance of the IEF—roughly $32 million—to the defined plan assets, reducing the County’s annual required contribution to alleviate the County’s financial shortage.  Finally, the ordinance imposed amortization periods and caps to be used in calculating the County’s annual required contribution to the fund.

Plaintiffs, the Wayne County Employees Retirement System and Wayne County Retirement Commission, contended the ordinance violated PERSIA by overriding the Retirement Commission’s discretion in taking such a credit and by imposing amortization periods and caps, as well as by treating trust assets as assets of the County.  Plaintiffs also brought constitutional arguments against the ordinance.  The trial court granted the County’s motion for summary disposition as to both the statutory and constitutional challenges.  The trial court also granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary disposition on the County’s counterclaim alleging a breach of fiduciary duty by the Retirement Commission in managing the Retirement System’s assets.  The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the County’s fiduciary claims, but reversed as to the validity of the ordinance because it violates PERSIA.

Among other findings, the court of appeals held that the ordinance directly conflicts with and is pre-empted by PERSIA’s exclusive-benefit rule.  The rule requires that a retirement system be a separate and distinct trust fund for the exclusive benefit of retirees.  MCL 38.1133(6).  The court observed that, for the average retiree, the 13th check of the year did not appear to be set apart from regular pension benefits.  The court reasoned that “[i]nstead of honoring and protecting the IEF in connection with its designated purpose, the County Board improperly invaded the assets of the IEF to lessen its financial burden” of annual contributions to the retirement fund.

After hearing evidence of the respondent mother’s substance abuse, mental illness, thoughts of harming her children, and lack of suitable housing, the trial court terminated her parental rights. The appellate court concurred with the trial court’s determination that the petitioner had proven two statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. The mother claimed that the clear and convincing evidence standard should also apply to the best-interests determination. The court of appeals disagreed.

The court applied the three-factor test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), to determine the appropriate standard of proof that due process would require.  First, there was no need for a heightened standard based on competing interests because, after statutory grounds for termination are established, the interests of the parent and child no longer coincide.  Second, a clear and convincing standard of proof would shift the risk of an erroneous determination to the state.  Lastly, a clear and convincing standard would impair the state’s interest in protecting the child and avoiding undue cost.  Finding that the preponderance standard had been met, the appellate court affirmed termination of parental rights.

The dissent concluded that plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim is likely to succeed because though Public Act 53 is viewpoint-neutral on its face, it is viewpoint-discriminatory in fact.  Examining the neutral justifications for Act 53 offered by the State of Michigan – saving money, promoting union accountability, and providing a “check on union power” – the dissent determined that Act 53 is impermissibly motivated by Michigan’s desire to suppress the school unions’ viewpoint.

The order attaches a transcript of a bond hearing in which Judge Post, over defense counsel’s repeated objections, asked the defendant state on the record when he last used controlled substances.  Judge Post wanted to determine when the defendant should be ordered to his first drug screening.  But each time Judge Post demanded an answer, defense counsel would interrupt to assert the defendant’s right to not incriminate himself.  Eventually, Judge Post had enough, fined the attorney, and had him jailed for contempt of court.

The order adopts the conclusions of the Judicial Tenure Commission that Judge Post’s conduct, among other things, was discourteous, improper and prejudicial to the proper administration of justice, and eroded public’s confidence in the judiciary.

LaJoice involves a malpractice claim brought by the decedent’s estate against the hospital and various physicians.  Here, the defective NOI was filed after the statute of limitations had expired but before the expiration of the wrongful-death savings statute.  The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim with prejudice after finding that the NOI was defective and did not constitute a good-faith attempt to comply with MCL 600.2912(b).  The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling reasoning.  It held that the NOI constituted a good-faith attempt to comply with MCL 600.2912(4) and, further, that any amendment of the NOI would relate back to the time the original NOI was filed, under the rule established in Bush v. Shabahang, 484 Mich. 156 (2009).  However, the Supreme Court noted an important difference distinguishing this case from the facts presented in Bush.  Here, unlike in Bush, the defective notice of intent was filed after the statute of limitations had expired.  The Court has already decided that issue—a late-filed defective notice of intent does not toll the wrongful-death savings period. 

Justice Cavanagh dissented and noted that, just as he expressed in his dissenting opinion in Waltz v. Wyse, 469 Mich. 642 (2004), he believes that MCL 600.5856 applies to toll the wrongful-death saving period.  He notes that the plain language of the statute establishes that filing a complaint tolls the limitations period.  Therefore, despite any defects in the plaintiff’s notice of intent, filing of the complaint tolled the wrongful-death saving period.  Accordingly, Justice Cavanagh writes that this plaintiff should be permitted to amend the notice of intent and proceed with the lawsuit.