Archive for the 'Adminstrative Law' Category

COA Opinion: Wayne County’s ordinance moving inflation-protection dollars into general retirement fund violates the Public Employee Retirement System Investment Act

In Wayne County Employees Retirement System v. Charter County of Wayne, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that Wayne County’s ordinance, which re-directed funds meant to protect retirees from inflation to offset the County’s annual required contribution to the retirement system, violated  the Public Employee Retirement System Investment Act (“PERSIA”), MCL 38.1132.  Read more »

MSC Grants Application To Review Detroit Edison Refund of Unapproved Rate Hike

The Supreme Court granted the application of an interest group challenging the Court of Appeals’ affirmance permitting Detroit Edison to issue a prospective rebate to its customers to refund a prior unapproved rate increase.  Our July 2012 post on the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the prospective rebate, and the dissent arguing that it was not permitted because it was contrary to the plain language of the statute at issue, can be found here.

Detroit Edison had implemented a rate hike to customers prior to receipt of Michigan Public Service Commission approval.  When only part of the rate increase was approved, Detroit Edison wanted to refund the overcharge by crediting a future bill.  The Association of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equity (ABATE) argued that such a refund was impermissible under the applicable statute and failed to compensate past customers who paid the unapproved additional charges.

COA rules that non-compliance with statutory time limit did not warrant dismissal of disciplinary proceeding

Though the board of veterinary medicine completed its disciplinary proceeding outside the statutory one-year time limit, the Court of Appeals in Department of Community Health v. Anderson held that this statutory requirement conveyed no substantive rights on the disciplined veterinarian and failure to comply with it did not warrant dismissal of the disciplinary action. The Court also reaffirmed that an agency’s credibility determinations are virtually unreviewable.

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COA Opinion: Medical examiner’s report must certify permanent disability before State Employees Retirement Board may retire an employee

In Polania v. State Employees Retirement Board, the Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the Board’s conclusion that it lacks discretion to retire employees against the medical examiner’s recommendation.  MCL 38.24(1)(b).  The plaintiff sought to retire from the Department of Human Services due to various conditions such as bi-polar disorder, diabetes, and other physical and emotional problems.  Two medical examiners concluded that these conditions did not amount to a permanent, total disability.  Based on this finding, the Board denied the plaintiff’s request for non-duty disability retirement.  The circuit court reversed the Board’s decision, concluding that the medical examiner’s report was not the last word, and that substantial evidence did not support it.  The court of appeals reversed, noting that the Legislature amended MCL 38.24 in 2002, and “unambiguously limited” the Board’s discretion to  retire employees to those situations where all criteria, including the medical examiner’s certification, are met.  Thus, the appellate court reversed the decision of the circuit court and affirmed the Board’s decision to deny the plaintiff’s retirement.

MSC Order List: January 18, 2013

The Michigan Supreme Court denied 11 applications for leave, and remanded three matters to the Court of Appeals or trial court.

In Michigan Insurance Company v. National Liability & Fire Insurance Company, the Supreme Court summarily reversed the Court of Appeals’ holding that an adult foster care home resident was covered on the home’s no-fault insurance policy, because it determined that the resident was not a “relative” of the home under the policy.

In Parks v. Department of Corrections, the Supreme Court summarily reversed the Court of Appeals in lieu of granting leave, and remanded the matter for reinstatement of the plaintiff-parolee’s habeas corpus complaint.  In that matter, MDOC rescinded an order of discharge from parole after determining it had miscalculated the parolee’s credit, and the Supreme Court confirmed that the MDOC does not have the power of rescission once the discharge is delivered.

COA Opinion: Michigan Civil Service Commission need not consider other agencies’ disability determinations

In Wescott v. Civil Service Commission, the Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the Michigan Civil Service Commission’s denial of an employee’s disability insurance benefits.  Although the circuit court held the denial was arbitrary and capricious because both the State Employee’s Retirement Board (SERB) and the Social Security Administration (SSA) determined that the employee was disabled, the Court of Appeals ruled that those decisions had no bearing on the Commission’s separate authority to make its own determination.

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Michigan Supreme Court holds that proposals to amend the Michigan Constitution need only comply with Article 12, Section 2

In Protect Mi Constitution v. Secretary of State, No. 145698, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Michigan Court of Appeals and vacated that court’s order of mandamus in lieu of granting leave to appeal.  The Court held that a ballot proposal that seeks voter approval of a constitutional amendment is governed by Article 12, Section 2 of the Michigan Constitution, not Article 4, Section 25.  The Court held that the latter applies to amendments of laws, not amendments to the Michigan Constitution.  The Court further held that there was no showing of a failure to comply with Article 12, Section 2, and it accordingly reversed the Court of Appeals, which had entered an order of mandamus after applying Article 4, Section 25. Read more »

COA Opinion: Detroit Edison may refund customer overpayment prospectively

In 2009 and 2010, Detroit Edison Co. self-implemented a rate increase while waiting for the Michigan Public Service Commission (“MPSC”) to act on its rate-increase request.  On January 11, 2010, the MPSC approved only a portion of Detroit Edison’s requested increase.  Detroit Edison proposed to refund its customers’ overpayments among customer classes based upon each customer class’s pro rata share of the total overpayment, by providing a discount on the January, 2010 billing cycle.  The Association of Business Advocating Tariff Equity (“ABATE”) objected because former primary customers of Detroit Edison, who paid the improperly high rates, would not receive a refund.  Despite the objection, the MPSC approved Detroit Edison’s plan, and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed.  In re Appl of Detroit Edison Co. to Increase Rates, No. 302110Read more »

COA Opinion: separation of powers doctrine not violated by Department of Human Services’ limitation on assistance benefits

The Michigan Court of Appeals considered several issues with respect to cash-assistance benefits under the Family Independence Program (FIP) in the consolidated appeals of Smith v. Department of Human Services Director.  In this case, the plaintiffs challenged the Department of Human Services (DHS) Director’s authority to impose a 60-month time limit on their cash-assistance benefits under the FIP.  First, the Court disagreed with the circuit court’s determination that the DHS Director violated the separation of powers doctrine by imposing the benefits time limit.  Instead, the Court held that the applicable statutes showed a clear legislative intent to allow the DHS to add eligibility criterion to the assistance program, particularly because the Director relied on fiscal soundness when making the decision to cut off the funds.  Next, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court’s determination that the DHS violated the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) by implementing the funding limit.  The Court held that, to the extent that federal funds were cut off after the 60-month time limit, the circuit court had erred because the DHS was following a federal mandate requiring that certain funds be limited to a cumulative period of no more than 60 months.  However, the Court noted that no such mandate existed as applied to state funds.  Accordingly, the Court held that, to the extent that the plaintiffs were entitled to FIP benefits derived from state funds, the circuit court was correct in finding a violation of the APA.  Finally, the Court upheld the circuit court’s issuance of class certification, reasoning that the DHS Director failed to show any basis for reversal of the circuit court’s finding that class action was a superior means of adjudicating the legal question presented in this case.

U.S. Supreme Court allows case about the Gun Lake Casino to go forward

Today the United States Supreme Court held, in Match-E-Be-Nash-She Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, that a lawsuit concerning the Gun Lake Casino was not barred by sovereign immunity, which means the case will proceed toward trial on the underlying legal issues.  The suit arose when a community member living near the then-proposed casino challenged whether the U.S. Department of the Interior was violating federal law by taking land into trust for the Gun Lake Band, because he believed that the Band did not qualify as an Indian tribe within the meaning of federal law.  The government and the Band argued that the courts could not reach that underlying question because, in their view, a particular federal statute (the Quiet Title Act) and its sovereign-immunity provisions precluded the suit.  (Sovereign immunity is the concept that one cannot sue the federal government unless Congress has passed a statute allowing the particular type of suit in question.)

In an 8-to-1 opinion written by Justice Kagan, the Supreme Court rejected the arguments of the U.S. Solicitor General and of the Band and held that the Quiet Title Act’s sovereign-immunity provisions did not apply because the plaintiff was not bringing a quiet-title claim.  Instead, he was bringing a suit under a different statute (the Administrative Procedure Act) and asserting a different type of claim:  a “garden-variety” claim, as the Court put it, that a federal agency had violated federal law.  Because the plaintiff was not claiming that he should be awarded title to the land in question, his suit did not fall within the scope of the Quiet Title Act, and therefore the sovereign-immunity provisions of that particular act did not apply.  Instead, the Court looked to the statute that actually governed claims of the sort that the plaintiff had brought and held that the “APA’s general waiver of sovereign immunity instead applies.”  This decision may have broad implications.  In the past, the government has successfully avoided review of its potentially illegal decisions taking land into trust by claiming that the Quiet Title Act barred review of even APA challenges, an argument that will no longer work.

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