One Court of Justice

The Department of Human Services (the “Department”) sent the applicant a notice which stated that her application for Medicaid disability benefits was denied and provided a reason for the denial.  The notice also contained several irrelevant citations to Department manuals that did not relate to disability determinations. The back of the notice stated that the applicant could request a hearing within 90 days of the date of the notice.  The applicant requested a hearing 368 days after the date of the notice and claimed that the incorrect citations to the manuals made the notice inadequate and that the 90-day period was therefore not triggered.  The hearing referee dismissed the applicant’s request for a hearing as untimely.  The applicant filed a petition for review with the circuit court, which agreed with the applicant’s reasoning.  On June 22, 2010, the Court of Appeals, in a published per curiam opinion in Schreur v. Department of Human Services, No. 285792, reversed the circuit court’s decision.  Interpreting federal regulations and the Michigan Administrative Code, the Court of Appeals relied on the distinction between “applicants” and “recipients” to conclude that the Department was not required to inform an applicant of the specific regulations that supported its denial.  Further, the Court of Appeals concluded that applicants are not bound by the 90-day request limitation applicable to recipients, but rather are allowed a “reasonable time” to request a hearing.  Here, the Court of Appeals determined that 368 days was not a reasonable time.

On April 6, 2010, the Michigan Court of Appeals published a per curiam opinion in Matthews v. Department of Natural Resources, No. 288040, affirming the ruling that plaintiffs had a prescriptive easement across state land, but reversing the ruling that they could fill the wetlands on that easement without obtaining a permit.  The Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiffs had properly tacked onto the possessory periods of their predecessors without a parol statement of conveyance because it was the only access they knew of and had used before the transfer of ownership.  However, their prescriptive easement did not excuse them from complying with environmental laws that required a permit before filling the wetland with pallets to use the easement. Read more »

On Friday, January 22, 2010, the Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in Beach v. Township of Lima to address whether a plaintiff who seeks to establish an adverse possession claim that affects property in a recorded plat must bring a claim under the Land Division Act if the plaintiff is not expressly requesting that the plat be vacated, corrected or revised.  The Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff need not bring a claim under the Land Division Act when he or she brings a quiet title action to establish adverse possession because a Land Division Act claim only alters the plat consistent with already existing property interests.  In other words, under the approach adopted by the Court of Appeals, a plaintiff may prevail in a quiet title action and later bring a claim under the Land Division Act to alter the plat–the two claims do not need to be brought simultaneously.  Such an approach has the effect of permitting inaccurate recorded plats.  The Michigan Supreme Court invited the Michigan Municipal League and the Real Property Section of the State Bar of Michigan to submit amicus briefs.  Our earlier post on the Court of Appeals’ decision is here.

Appellate criminal defense practitioners should note Justice Corrigan’s concurrence in People v. Henderson, No. 139375.  In Henderson, the Court of Appeals dismissed the defendant’s appeal because he did not timely file his appeal brief.  The Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case  to the Court of Appeals for consideration as though the defendant’s brief had been timely filed because the delay was solely attributable to the neglect of appellate counsel.  The Court concluded that defendant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel and ordered appellate counsel to pay costs to the Court.  Justice Corrigan concurred recommending that in cases where an attorney fails to timely prosecute a criminal appeal and thereby deprives the defendant of effective assistance of counsel, the Court should refer the negligent counsel to the Attorney Grievance Commission. Read more »

On July 14, 2009, the Court of Appeals published its per curiam opinion in Great Wolf Lodge of Traverse City, L.L.C. v. Michigan Public Service Comm’n, Nos. 281398, 281404.  The primary issue concerned the decision of the Public Service Commission and the Circuit Court requiring Great Wolf Lodge resort in Traverse City to continue electrical service with Cherryland Electric Cooperative based upon Public Service Commission regulations prohibiting existing utility customers from transfering from one utility to another. Cherryland provided electrical service to a farm on the relevant property prior to Great Wolf’s purchase and transformation of the property into a resort, but at the time of the purchase the only buildings on the property were abandoned, and none had active electrical service.  The Public Service Commission and Circuit Court relied on precedent (In re Complaint of Consumers Energy, 255 Mich App 496; 660 NW2d 785 (2003)) that established that a change of ownership and demolition of buildings does not, by itself, extinguish an existing customer-utility relationship.  The Court of Appeals followed this precedent but noted that, even under these rules, there are situations where the existing customer relationship can be severed.  In particular, the Court stated that if the prior owner terminated electric service for a significant period of time for reasons other than a change in ownership, then the “existing customer” relationship would have been severed, and Great Wolf would not be considered and existing customer.  The Court of Appeals concluded that the existing record was insufficient to make a determination on this issue and remanded the case to the Public Service Commission for additional factual development.  Additionally, Cherryland argued that an alternate municipal provider could not service Great Wolf because of a statutory requirement prohibiting such providers from rendering service to those “already receiving the service from another utility.”  MCL 124.3(2)  The Court of Appeals concluded that the relevant inquiry is whether there were existing facilities on the property that were already receiving service from Cherryland at the time of Great Wolf’s purchase.  Again the Court of Appeals remanded the issue to the Public Service Commission for additional factual development.

Yesterday, the Michigan Court of Appeals released a published, per curiam, opinion in Cummins v. Robinson Twp., Case No. 279020. The opinion interprets the State Construction Code Act (“SCCA”) and constitutional law.

In this case, the plaintiffs owned residential property in subdivisions that became flooded. Some plaintiffs sought to restore their homes following the floods, but were precluded from doing so because of construction standards imposed by certain of the defendants, including township building officials. The plaintiffs sued, contending that the defendants had conspired to deprive them of their constitutional rights, had engaged in unconstitutional taking of property, and had violated their rights to substantive due process. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for the defendants.  The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition in favor of the defendant on all of the plaintiffs’ claims. Read more »