One Court of Justice

In People v. Koon, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (“MMMA”), MCL 333.26421, allows a registered patient to drive when he has marihuana in his system but is not otherwise “under the influence” of marihuana, because the MMMA supersedes the portion of the Michigan Vehicle Code that prohibits a person from driving with any amount of a schedule 1 controlled substance in his system, MCL 257.625(8). In this case, an officer stopped the defendant for speeding and administered a blood test after the defendant informed the officer that he was a registered MMMA patient and had smoked marihuana about five hours before the stop. The test revealed THC, the active component of marihuana, in the defendant’s blood, and he was prosecuted under MCL 257.625(8), because marihuana is still a schedule 1 controlled substance despite the MMMA.

Even though a patient is no longer protected from prosecution by the MMMA if he or she “drives under the influence of marihuana,” the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that driving under the influence “contemplates something more than having any amount of marihuana in one’s system” and therefore the defendant should be protected from prosecution if the marihuana was not affecting him while he was driving. The MMMA provides that all other laws that are inconsistent with the act no longer apply to the medical use of marihuana; and the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that MCL 257.625(8) was one of those laws. The Court suggested that the legislature develop a legal limit for blood concentration of THC to determine what “under the influence” means for the purposes of the MMMA.

The Michigan Supreme Court granted the application for leave to appeal in People v. Lafountain.  The parties shall address:  (1) whether to prove a violation under MCL 33.7401c which “involves the possession, placement or use of a firearm,” the presence of a firearm in a room accessed by the defendant is sufficient, if the defendant occupied another room where methamphetamine was manufactured within a residence of another; and (2) whether the court may assess points for a prior record variable 7 (PRV), MCL 777.57, where the defendant was convicted by a jury of charges that were subsequently vacated.  The Michigan Supreme Court invited the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan and the Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan to file briefs amicus curiae.  The unpublished Court of Appeals opinion can be found here.

In People v Lloyd, the Court of Appeals affirmed an award for three times the actual amount of restitution under the Crime Victim’s Civil Rights Act when the defendant caused the victim to lose an eye because the injury was a “serious impairment of body function” under the statute.

The Crime Victim’s Rights Act, MCL 780.766(5), provides that a person who is the victim of a crime that results in a “serious impairment of body function” may be awarded up to three times the restitution amount, at the trial court’s discretion.  In this case, the defendant struck the victim in the eye with a high-heeled shoe, causing the victim to lose her eye.  She was found guilty of misdemeanor assault, and the trial court tripled the restitution award under the statute.  The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the defendant’s argument that the court should not have tripled the restitution award for the loss of an eye.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that the loss of an eye constitutes a “serious impairment of a body function,” and the plain language does not limit or specify what the trial court may consider in exercising its discretion.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to triple the actual restitution award.

The Michigan Supreme Court granted the application for leave to appeal in People v. Johnson.  The parties shall address:  (1) whether the amendment of the supplemental notice of intent to seek to enhance the defendant’s sentence was contrary to MCL 769.13, and if so, what remedy the defendant is entitled, if any; and (2) whether the trial had authority to sentence the defendant as a fourth habitual offender, if the original notice was defective and no order was entered allowing the notice to be amended.  The Court invited the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan, the Criminal Defense Attorneys Association of Michigan, and the Criminal Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan to file briefs amicus curiae.

In People v. Howell, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s amendment of the defendant’s sentences for crimes committed while on parole—to specify that the new sentences would run consecutively with his prior sentence—merely corrected an omission by the court and was therefore permissible under Michigan’s court rules.  The defendant was not entitled to notice or a hearing regarding the amendment because the court’s mistake was not substantive.  Additionally, the amendment was not inconsistent with the defendant’s plea agreement, which did not address the defendant’s parole. Read more »

In the consolidated cases of People v. Jones and People v. Anderson, the Court of Appeals held that imposition of an increased crime-victim-rights assessment (CVRA) on a convicted felon did not violate the constitutional ex post facto clauses, even when the standard assessment amount was increased occurred after the defendants committed the felonies.  The CVRA does not constitute punishment, and, therefore, does not impermissibly increase the penalty for a certain crime.  Read more »

In People v. Eliason, the Court of Appeals held that, while a mandatory life sentence for a juvenile constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the United States and Michigan constitutions, the option of a life sentence either with or without parole grants a court sufficient discretion to satisfy constitutional requirements.  Furthermore, a court may constitutionally impose a life sentence without parole after weighing the relevant factors, including the offender’s age.   Read more »

In what promises to be an important decision for post-conviction relief petitions, our Supreme Court has granted an application to address the applicable standard for an innocence claim under MCR 6.508(D).  This particular armed robbery case — with an apparently long procedural history – originates from a 1995 Wayne County Circuit Court criminal file, People v William Craig Garrett.  Two currently sitting justices, Markman and Cavanagh, have previously voted to grant leave for this case on a prior trip up to our high court.  It appears that ineffective assistance of counsel at trial will also be an issue in this appeal.

Besides the threshold legal standard, the parties are asked to address: (1) whether this case meets the applicable standard; (2) whether any other rule under the 6.500 series offers relief for a “significant possibility” of actual innocence; and (3) whether, if MCR 6.508(D) does bar relief, if there’s any recourse for a person with “a significant possibility of actual innocence” under the Michigan or U.S. Constitutions.

Justice McCormack, who recently joined the bench after a long career bringing 6.500 petitions and similar actual innocence cases, concurred to suggest additional analysis of these issues: (1) whether MCR 6.508(D)(2) bars relief premised on issues previously decided on direct appeal; (2) whether that subsection bars relief for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel premised on an issue decided against the defendant on direct appeal; (3) the scope of relief available under MCR 7.316(A)(7) (which allows the MSC to “enter any judgment or order that ought to have been entered, and enter other and further orders and grant relief as the case may require”) in light of MCR 6.508(D); and (4) when MCR 6.508(D) bars relief, if a court may then consider evidence and arguments presented at an earlier stage of review.  Justice Markman joined Justice McCormack’s concurrence.  In addition, the bench invited amici briefs from Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan and the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.

The Supreme Court denied Mr. Garrett’s original application for leave to appeal in 1997.  456 Mich. 876 (Sept. 29, 1997).  The trial court later held an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Garrett’s motion for a new trial based on newly discovered alibi evidence (as well as new polygraph and other evidence), and granted a new trial in April 1999.  The Court of Appeals peremptorily reversed that order, but only addressed the alibi evidence issue, on July 28, 1999 (Docket No. 219803).  On leave granted, the Court of Appeals later took up the issue of the complainant’s mental condition, and its effect on her testimony, and whether the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, but again denied relief.  No. 222304, 2001 WL 1388398 (Nov. 6, 2001).  In 2003, the Supreme Court denied Mr. Garrett’s application for leave again, although Justices Markman, Cavanagh and Kelly would have granted leave.  467 Mich. 936 (Jan. 3, 2003).

In People v. Wambar the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for assisting in the unlawful taking of a child, despite the fact that the defendant was the child’s biological father, because the defendant’s parental rights had been terminated.  Michigan Statute MCL 750.350 prohibits the taking of a child from his parent or guardian, but exempts the natural or adoptive parent of the child from conviction under the statute.  The court held that for the purpose of the statute, the term “natural parent” does not include a biological parent whose parental rights have been terminated.

In People v. Guajardo, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the evidence did not support a jury instruction on self-defense because, despite the fact that the victim threatened to kill the defendant, the victim subsequently retreated to a bedroom.  The court further reasoned that the defendant  did not possess a reasonable and honest belief that he was in immediate danger because he brought what he thought was an unloaded gun into the bedroom to confront the victim.