One Court of Justice

In Michigan Association of Chiropractors v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, the Court of Appeals considered whether the trial court had properly certified three classes.  The Court held that because two of the classes dealt with whether Blue Cross Blue Shield (“BCBS”) had certain across-the-board policies, the classes were properly certified as to declaratory relief only. Read more »

The Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s certification of five classes in Michigan Association of Chiropractors v. Blue Care Network of Michigan, Inc.  In considering these classes, the Court adopted the federal requirement that class membership must be capable of determination by objective criteria.  Four of the five classes survived this test and were affirmed on appeal with some modifications. Read more »

In Badeen v. Par, Inc., plaintiffs failed to file their motion for class certification within 91 days of the complaint in which they first made class allegations.  But the motion was filed with 91 of plaintiffs’ amended complaint.  The trial court denied the motion as untimely and struck the class allegations.  The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the 91-day clock runs from the most recently filed complaint.  Under that standard, the motion was timely.

However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the lawsuit on the merits.  At issue in the lawsuit was lenders’ practice of hiring middlemen to handle collection on automobile loans.  The middleman would then hire plaintiffs (and similarly situated persons) to perform the actual repossession of the automobiles.  Plaintiffs complained that this lowered their compensation and was in violation of the Occupational Code, suing both the middlemen and the lenders.  The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of defendants because there was no violation of the Occupational Code.  The Court of Appeals agreed.  Because the middlemen were not actually engaged in the collection of the delinquent loans, they did not need to be licensed collection agencies under the Occupational Code.

In Thomas M. Cooley Law School v. Doe, the Court of Appeals rejected the frameworks used by other states to protect a speaker’s First Amendment interest in anonymity.  The Court held that Michigan’s procedures for protective orders and summary disposition adequately protect that interest.  Read more »

In Duncan v. Michigan, the Court of Appeals held that the law of the case doctrine prevented the trial court from reconsidering whether plaintiffs lacked standing.  The state of Michigan argued that the law of the case doctrine did not apply because of an intervening change in the law with respect to standing.  Specifically, the Supreme Court had reinstated Michigan’s “prudential standing” test after the trial court initially decided the standing issue.  The state, however, had appealed the trial court’s initial decision regarding standing, and the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed that decision after it reinstated the prudential standing test.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reasoned that in the instant appeal, the intervening change in law did not prevent application of the law of the case doctrine because the Michigan Supreme Court was “surely aware of the change in the law” when it affirmed the initial decision regarding the plaintiffs’ standing.

In Meier v. Awaad et. al., plaintiffs issued a subpoena to the Michigan Department of Community Health (“MDCH”) seeking the identities of Medicaid beneficiaries who were diagnosed by the defendant physician as having either epliepsy or a seizure disorder.  Plaintiffs sought this information in connection with their class action claim that this doctor had intentionally misdiagnosed them, and others, with these conditions for his own financial gain.  In ruling on this subpoena, the Court of Appeals considered Michigan’s statutory physician-patient privilege and held:  (1)  that the defendants (the physician and related entities) were entitled to raise the privilege issue; and (2)  that even though the information was not sought from a physician, the privilege still protects the information from disclosure.  Read more »

In Prins v. State Police, the Court of Appeals was evaluating the trial court’s award of attorney fees in a lawsuit over the failure of the state policy to turn over some requested information under FOIA.  In considering the attorney fee amount requested by the prevailing plaintiff, the trial court simply found that a reasonable fee for the matter was a “$175 per hour at 70 hours” without any other analysis.  On appeal, the Court noted that, in Smith v. Khouri, the Michigan Supreme Court laid out a mutli-factor approach in determining a reasonable attorney fee.  In this case, however, there was nothing on the record to suggest that the trial court had engaged in this required approach.  The Court of Appeals, therefore, remanded the case for reevaluation of the attorney fee issue pursuant to Smith.

A Michigan statute (MCL 791.234b) provides that a state prisoner shall be paroled and released to the federal government for purposes of deportation if the individual was (1) not serving that sentence for particular enumerated crimes; (2) was subject to a final order of deportation; and (3) had “served at least 1/2 of the minimum sentence imposed by the court.”  In Chico-Polo v Dep’t of Corrections, the Court of Appeals addressed the applicability of statute to a prisoner that met the first two conditions of the statute, but was serving a life sentence.  The prisoner argued that because he had served ten years, and would be eligible for parole after 20 years, he had served half of the minimum sentence.  The Court disagreed.  It found that the statute requires that the prisoner serve half the minimum sentence “imposed by the court” and that, here, the criminal trial court had not imposed a minimum sentence, but instead imposed a life sentence.  Judge Boonstra agreed with the result of the per curiam opinion of Judges Hoekstra and Borrello, but found, in a concurring opinion, that the statute was vague as applied to this situation and that, as such, the prisoner did not meet the high bar required in his mandamus action seeking release under the statute because he could not demonstrate the required “clear legal right” to the action sought.

The Michigan Supreme Court denied two motions to waive fees in prisoner civil actions, noting that MCL 600.2963 requires that a prisoner pursuing a civil action be liable for filing fees.

In Vertex Development LLC v Fifth Third Bank, the Michigan Court of Appeals enforced the plaintiff’s release of all claims against the Bank after determining that the Bank had not fraudulently induced the release.  The plaintiff claimed the Bank’s failure to loan it additional funds and fraudulent actions by the Bank’s former loan officer had set the plaintiff up for failure.  However, the plaintiff had previously signed a release of all such claims against the Bank in a negotiated settlement.  After the settlement, the former loan officer pleaded guilty to federal bank fraud charges. The court granted the Bank’s motion for summary disposition based on the plaintiff’s prior release of all claims against the Bank, which the court noted was predicated the fraudulent behavior of the Bank’s former employee.  The court reasoned that the subsequent criminal case against the former loan officer was “immaterial” and did not indicate fraudulent inducement of the plaintiff’s release.  

Disclaimer: Warner Norcross & Judd, LLP represented Fifth Third Bank in this litigation.