One Court of Justice

In Smitter v Thornapple Township, Case No. 144354, the Court granted leave to appeal the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  The Court previously had considered an application for leave to appeal an earlier order from the Court of Appeals, and had, in lieu of granting, remanded this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.  The case involves questions of coordinating statutory workers’ compensation benefits with other insurance.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission holding that the Second Injury Fund may not reduce its reimbursement to the township to reflect the township’s unexercised right to coordinate benefits.

In People v Franklin, No. 142323, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals.  We previously discussed the case here.  In that case, Mr. Franklin was convicted in a bench trial of first-degree home invasion, larceny of a building, and larceny of a firearm.  Mr. Franklin previously had pleaded guilty to the second-degree home invasion charge, but the trial court had set aside his plea because it contained a sentencing provision the court refused to enforce.

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court was not bound to accept the sentence portion of the plea agreement, but the trial court could not unilaterally set aside the plea itself.  Instead, it held that under MCR 6.310(B)(2), the trial court was required to provide Mr. Franklin with an opportunity to affirm or withdraw the plea.  The Court of Appeals accordingly vacated the conviction.

On leave to appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed.  It held that the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted MCR 6.130(B)(2).  It further held, however, that the trial court had not plainly erred in not affording Mr. Franklin the opportunity to affirm or withdraw his plea because People v Grove, 455 Mich 439 (1997), authorized the trial court to reject the plea agreement and subject the defendant to trial over his objection.  The Court held that Grove was superseded by MCR 6.130(B), so in the future such error will be plain, but that it was not plain error on the part of the trial court not to realize it.  The Court further noted that, even if it was plain error for the trial court to deny Mr. Franklin the opportunity to affirm his plea as required by the new court rule, the Court had discretion not to reverse his convictions because he did not sufficiently object to the error, and he should not be permitted to “harbor error as an appellate parachute.”  For these reasons the Court reversed.

In lieu of granting leave to appeal in In re Estate of Rosa Louise Parks, Nos. 143419-22, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, concluding that counsel’s reference during oral argument to fees charged by the court-appointed fiduciaries did not constitute a breach of a settlement agreement’s confidentiality provision, and the Court of Appeals’ finding that it did was clearly erroneous.  The Court remanded to the Wayne County Probate Court and instructed the court to implement paragraph 1 of the settlement agreement within 30 days of the date of the order.

In lieu of granting leave to appeal in McMurtrie v. Eaton Corp., No. 143779, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed in part the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) and remanded the case to the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (MCAC), as successor to the WCAC, for the MCAC to determine whether the plaintiff’s wage loss is due to his injury.

The Court vacated its earlier order and denied the application for leave to appeal in Progressive Michigan Ins. Co. v. Smith, No. 141255, because the Court was no longer persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by the Court.

In People v. Brown, No. 143733, the Court ordered the Clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the application for leave to appeal.  The Court directed the parties to address whether the defendant was entitled to any relief when he was sentenced to a longer sentence than the maximum sentence that was disclosed in the plea proceeding.

The Court also denied 3 applications for leave to appeal and administratively closed another case due to bankruptcy.

Plaintiff worked as a painter on the Mackinac Bridge for over 25 years, for various employers.  Plaintiff was working for Allstate Painting Company, Inc. (Allstate) in May 2005 when he injured his right knee.  Plaintiff filed a petition seeking benefits from Allstate, which did not have workers’ compensation insurance.  Although the magistrate granted Plaintiff an open award of benefits against Allstate, Plaintiff was unable to collect.  Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action seeking benefits from defendants Mackinac Bridge Authority (the Authority) and American Painting Company, Inc. (American Painting) under Section 171 of the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), the statutory employment provision.  MCL 418.171.  The magistrate applied res judicata, or claim preclusion, to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against the Authority and American Painting because the magistrate concluded Plaintiff could have brought his Section 171 claim in his earlier action against Allstate.  The Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) affirmed the magistrate’s dismissal in a 2-1 decision.  In Bennett v. Mackinac Bridge Authority, No. 287628, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the WCAC and remanded the case to the magistrate for reinstatement.  The Court of Appeals concluded that application of the doctrine of res judicata in this case to bar Plaintiff’s Section 171 claim against defendants would subvert the intent of the Legislature because it would, in effect, read a rule of mandatory party joinder in Section 171.  The Court of Appeals explained that the Legislature has, in other provisions, required the joinder of parties or prescribed methods for compelling the joinder of parties, and neither provision exists in Section 171.  Thus, the Court of Appeals determined that the an injured employee may bring separate workers’ compensation actions against a direct employer and statutory employer under Section 171 without having to join all potentially liable parties in a single action.

On August 24, 2010, the Court of Appeals published its per curiam opinion in Findley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 291402.  The case arose from an appeal from the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission (“WCAC”) which had affirmed a magistrate’s denial of benefits.  In affirming that decision, one commissioner issued an opinion that analyzed and adopted the magistrate’s findings.  Another member concurred “in result only” and provided no explanation, while the last member of the three-commissioner panel dissented.  The Court of Appeals held that it can only review the decisions of a “true majority” of a WCAC panel, and that this did not constitute a true majority.  The Court concluded that a “true majority” is an opinion in which a majority of the commissioners agree on the material facts and ultimate outcome.  Here, it is not clear that a majority of the commissioners agree on the facts because the second member of the majority only concurred in the result.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the WCAC for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs, employed as power plant operators, suffered injuries when hot ash exploded out of one of the boilers while they were emptying bottom ash from it.  Plaintiffs alleged that the employer was liable under the intentional tort exception to the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act’s (WDCA) exclusive remedy provision, MCL § 418.131(1).  Under the second sentence of MCL § 418.131(1), the plaintiff can satisfy the specific intent requirement of an intentional tort claim if the plaintiff can show that the employer had “actual knowledge” that an injury is “certain to occur” yet “willfully disregards” it.  In a per curiam opinion in Johnson v. Detroit Edison Co., No. 289763, published on June 15, 2010, the Court of Appeals determined that plaintiffs proffered sufficient circumstantial evidence in support of their intentional tort claim to survive summary disposition.  The Court of Appeals held that a jury may conclude that an employer knew the injury was “certain to occur” where a plaintiff can show that (1) the employer subjects the employee to a continuously operative dangerous condition that it knows will cause an injury; (2) the employer knows that its employees are taking insufficient precautions to protect themselves against the danger; and (3) the employer takes no action to remedy the situation.

In a 5-2 decision issued Monday, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that recent changes to Michigan workers’ compensation law should not be applied retroactively.  Brewer v. A.D. Transport Express, Inc., No. 139068, involved application of  2008 PA 499, which amended MCL § 418.845 to expand the Workers’ Compensation Agency’s jurisdiction over out-of-state injuries.  In an opinion authored by Justice Corrigan and joined by Justices Cavanagh, Young, and Markman, the Court held that the statutory text does not manifest the Legislature’s intent to apply the amendment to antecedent injuries.  Moreover, the amendment did not fall within an exception for remedial or procedural amendments that may apply retroactively, because the amendment created a new legal burden and potentially enlarged existing substantive rights.  Chief Justice Kelly concurred in the result only.  Justices Weaver and Hathaway dissented, explaining that rather than deciding the case’s merits following oral argument on the application for leave to appeal, the Court should have granted leave for full briefing and argument.

On Friday, December 4, 2009, the Michigan Supreme Court denied three applications for leave to appeal, denied one prisoner’s motion to waive his filing fees, and corrected its previous order in Lansing Schools Education Association v. Lansing School Board, Case No. 138401, to include a dissenting opinion by Justice Young.  The Court also peremptorily reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the decision of the worker’s compensation magistrate in Loos v. J.B. Installed Sales, Inc., Case No. 137987, which is discussed after the jump. Read more »

On October 13, 2009, the Court of Appeals published its unanimous decision in Fries v. Mavrick Metal Stamping, Inc., et al., Case No. 283193.  In Fries, the Court of Appeals considered whether an employee’s injury, sustained when her clothing caught in a stamping press, qualified as an intentional tort and, therefore, was an exception to the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act’s exclusive remedy rule.  Here, the employer had been notified that the clothing of another employee had previously been caught in the machine, and that its managers were not monitoring proper use of safety mechanisms on the machines.  On appeal, Mavrick argued that even if this evidence was true, it did not constitute notice that a continuous dangerous condition existed that was certain to lead to injury.  Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Antrim County Circuit Court’s order denying Defendant Mavrick’s motion for summary disposition, holding that the circumstantial evidence on record was sufficient that a reasonable jury could conclude that Mavrick was on notice that a continuous dangerous condition existed.  A copy of the court’s order can be found here. Read more »

On September 23, 2009, the Michigan Supreme Court denied thirteen applications for leave to appeal. It vacated and remanded two criminal cases and one civil case. The Court granted one motion for immediate consideration and it also took substantive action in one criminal case and one civil case. These are discussed after the jump. Read more »

On July 31, 2009, the Michigan Supreme Court published an opinion in Petersen v. Magna Corp., et al.  Chief Justice Kelly, joined in full by Justice Cavanagh, and in part by Justices Hathaway and Weaver, affirmed the Court of Appeals’ opinion and held that the prorated attorney fee provision of Michigan Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.315(1), applies only to employers and their insurance carriers.  Justice Markman, joined in full by Justice Corrigan and in part by Justice Young, dissented.  A summary of the Court of Appeals’ opinion can be found here. Read more »