One Court of Justice

In People v. Koon, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (“MMMA”), MCL 333.26421, allows a registered patient to drive when he has marihuana in his system but is not otherwise “under the influence” of marihuana, because the MMMA supersedes the portion of the Michigan Vehicle Code that prohibits a person from driving with any amount of a schedule 1 controlled substance in his system, MCL 257.625(8). In this case, an officer stopped the defendant for speeding and administered a blood test after the defendant informed the officer that he was a registered MMMA patient and had smoked marihuana about five hours before the stop. The test revealed THC, the active component of marihuana, in the defendant’s blood, and he was prosecuted under MCL 257.625(8), because marihuana is still a schedule 1 controlled substance despite the MMMA.

Even though a patient is no longer protected from prosecution by the MMMA if he or she “drives under the influence of marihuana,” the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that driving under the influence “contemplates something more than having any amount of marihuana in one’s system” and therefore the defendant should be protected from prosecution if the marihuana was not affecting him while he was driving. The MMMA provides that all other laws that are inconsistent with the act no longer apply to the medical use of marihuana; and the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that MCL 257.625(8) was one of those laws. The Court suggested that the legislature develop a legal limit for blood concentration of THC to determine what “under the influence” means for the purposes of the MMMA.

The Michigan Supreme Court granted the application for leave to appeal in NACG Leasing v. Dep’t of Treasury.  The parties shall address the applicability of the use tax to a purchase of tangible personal property by one party and leased to another party, where the purchaser/lessor does not obtain actual possession of the property.

The Michigan Supreme Court granted the application for leave to appeal in People v. Lafountain.  The parties shall address:  (1) whether to prove a violation under MCL 33.7401c which “involves the possession, placement or use of a firearm,” the presence of a firearm in a room accessed by the defendant is sufficient, if the defendant occupied another room where methamphetamine was manufactured within a residence of another; and (2) whether the court may assess points for a prior record variable 7 (PRV), MCL 777.57, where the defendant was convicted by a jury of charges that were subsequently vacated.  The Michigan Supreme Court invited the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan and the Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan to file briefs amicus curiae.  The unpublished Court of Appeals opinion can be found here.

In Urbain v. Beierling, the Court of Appeals held that a partner did not breach an open-ended partnership agreement by unilaterally dissolving the partnership because an open-ended partnership could be dissolved by the express will of any partner pursuant to the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA), MCL 449.31. According to the UPA, if a partner unilaterally dissolves a partnership agreement, no breach occurs if the agreement has no definite term or specific undertaking. In this case, plaintiff and defendants agreed to establish an educational software business. Plaintiff argued that a breach occurred when defendants dissolved the relationship because the partners agreed to specific undertakings such as creating, funding, marketing, and launching a website or any future websites. The Court of Appeals disagreed and reasoned that because the agreement had an option of creating future websites, it was indefinite and open-ended. Therefore, the Court held that the partnership agreement could be dissolved by the express will of any partner pursuant to the UPA. The Court also noted that plaintiff was not entitled to any damages as a result of the dissolution because the partnership was not profitable at the time of dissolution.

In Michigan v. Snyder, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a prior theft conviction is inadmissible at trial for purposes of impeachment because a theft conviction typically fails to meet the requirements for admissibility under the Michigan Rules of Evidence (MRE) 609.

MRE 609 provides that a witness’s prior theft conviction may be admitted at trial if the prior theft conviction has significant probative value to the witness’s credibility. Determining significant probative value contains two elements: the age of the conviction and the degree to which the conviction of the crime is indicative of veracity. In this case, defendant was convicted at trial for stealing four pieces of silver. Defendant moved to exclude a prior theft conviction before trial, but the trial court denied the motion and admitted the conviction. In a previous opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court’s decision because the trial court failed to analyze whether the prior conviction had significant probative value towards credibility. On remand, the trial court once again admitted the prior conviction and reasoned that the prior conviction had significant probative value because its facts were different from the facts of this case. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred once again because it did not analyze the two elements required to determine significant probative value. In its own analysis, the Court of Appeals held that, although defendant’s prior conviction occurred two years ago, generally a prior theft conviction is not of significant probative value. The Court reasoned that previous opinions have held theft crimes to be minimally probative, or, at most, moderately probative, which does not surpass the MRE’s “significant” threshold. Therefore, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred and reversed and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its findings.

In Lewanee Co v Wagley, the Court of Appeals held that interest on a condemnation award was properly determined by calculating it from the time that the county took possession of an “avigation” easement, because the property owners did not have to be deprived of the entirety of their property in order for interest to begin accruing.  An “avigation” easement prevents a property owner from using the airspace over her property at a certain height, and is an acceptable alternative to the complete acquisition of property in an airport’s “runway protection zone.” Read more »

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In People v Lloyd, the Court of Appeals affirmed an award for three times the actual amount of restitution under the Crime Victim’s Civil Rights Act when the defendant caused the victim to lose an eye because the injury was a “serious impairment of body function” under the statute.

The Crime Victim’s Rights Act, MCL 780.766(5), provides that a person who is the victim of a crime that results in a “serious impairment of body function” may be awarded up to three times the restitution amount, at the trial court’s discretion.  In this case, the defendant struck the victim in the eye with a high-heeled shoe, causing the victim to lose her eye.  She was found guilty of misdemeanor assault, and the trial court tripled the restitution award under the statute.  The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the defendant’s argument that the court should not have tripled the restitution award for the loss of an eye.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that the loss of an eye constitutes a “serious impairment of a body function,” and the plain language does not limit or specify what the trial court may consider in exercising its discretion.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to triple the actual restitution award.

In Wayne County Employees Retirement System v. Charter County of Wayne, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that Wayne County’s ordinance, which re-directed funds meant to protect retirees from inflation to offset the County’s annual required contribution to the retirement system, violated  the Public Employee Retirement System Investment Act (“PERSIA”), MCL 38.1132.  Read more »

In In re Moss Minors, the Court of Appeals held that a court must determine whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest by a preponderance of the evidence. Read more »